The Fragility of Trigger-Tag Mechanisms for Misuse Detection in Open-Weight LLMs
Open-weight language models can be downloaded, modified, and deployed beyond their developers' control, limiting the effectiveness of centrally enforced safeguards. Recent work has therefore proposed \emph{trigger-tag} mechanisms that produce a detectable signal when a model is used under a target condition, such as generating phishing contents. Although these mechanisms borrow from established techniques, their use for conditional misuse detection in open-weight LLMs is relatively new. Therefore, existing research works have not systematically studied the robustness of trigger-tag mechanisms under adversarial attacks. To close this gap, (i)~we formalize trigger-tags and distinguish \emph{token-level trigger-tags}, which introduce watermark-inspired signals during decoding, from \emph{weight-level trigger-tags}, which learn backdoor-inspired associations between target conditions and detectable model behavior. Furthermore, (ii)~we introduce \Untag, a unified attack framework that organizes their mechanism-specific attack surfaces into a common taxonomy. We evaluate representative token-level and weight-level trigger-tags using phishing as a case study. We find that while…
- arXiv
- 2610.03124
- Authors
- Toluwani Aremu, Manit Baser, Mohan Gurusamy, Nils Lukas, Dinil Mon Divakaran
- Categories
- cs.CR · cs.AI · cs.CL · cs.CY · cs.LG