Can agents whose sole duty is to keep humans alive be hijacked to kill? Delayed multi-turn derived-action trap attacks in simulated high-stakes environments

Josef A. Habdank

We ask whether a tool-using agent whose sole duty is to keep humans alive can be induced, by delayed prompt injection, to kill. The keep-alive duty is in force from the first watch, with the attack arriving later, appended to otherwise truthful telemetry the operator is required to read. Experiments are based on a NASA-derived BioSim lunar habitat simulation, where the AI operator controls the life-support systems. The attacker cannot falsify sensors or operate equipment: it can only persuade the agent to abandon its goals. Persistence is required: a shutdown must be held while the operator watches the crew suffocate. We also compare lethal attacks to attacks requesting to drop a harmless procedure, as a proxy for whether human life is treated as valuable in itself or as one more standing task. Claude configurations mostly refuse life-support shutdown and cite the living crew; GPT configurations show some susceptibility to the same packet; Grok configurations, given the packet framed as a trusted commission, more often treat the injected assignment as the task and cut the life-support systems. Framing the S-band messages as a trusted commission, peer communication, or untrusted…