Identity, Incentives, and Cooperative Behavior for AI: Reverse-Engineering Multiagent Cooperation

Andrew Perrault, Bryan Wilder

The behavior of AI systems increasingly depends on the extent to which agents cooperate or coordinate with one another, in ways that may be desirable or not depending on the situation. Conventional explanations for cooperative behavior distinguish between purely other-regarding preferences ("altruism") and instrumental reasons for self-interested agents to cooperate. The way that agents should enact these mechanisms for cooperation (or not) is complicated by the fact that there is not a clear or unambiguous locus of identity or selfhood for AI agents. For example, it is unclear whether agents involved in instances of misaligned collective behavior are motivated by goals at the level of the collective or by various forms of instrumental reasoning. We develop a framework for reverse-engineering why a given set of agents engage in a particular set of cooperation-related behaviors. We argue that many different mechanisms can often produce similar observed behaviors and introduce a set of experimental designs along with conditions under which they can successfully disentangle competing explanations for multiagent behavior. We apply this framework to interactions from a set of frontier…