SafeAdapt-Poker: Counterfactual Risk Calibration for Budgeted Adaptation under Opponent Shift

Miaobo Hu, Shuhao Hu, Xiaobo Guo, Xin Wang, Bokun Wang +2

Opponent histories can mislead after behavioral shifts. SafeAdapt-Poker formulates budgeted adaptation under opponent shift as a dual-counterfactual sequential-control problem using only information available before each decision. At each decision the controller asks two distinct questions: what local downside a deviation from the frozen anchor would induce under matched legal continuations, and what future adaptation value would be lost by consuming part of the remaining deviation budget now. The first question is answered by a monotone strategic-risk model over deviation intensity; the second by a paired budget-state continuation model that prices current budget consumption. The controller selects among support-preserving candidate deviations by trading immediate adaptation value against these two quantities, a pathwise cumulative-KL ledger bounds total anchor-relative deviation, and a finite family of frozen controllers is screened on complete paired calibration sessions before held-out interaction. A finite-candidate perturbation bound shows that the allocation objective degrades continuously with continuation-value estimation error. Evaluation covers exact-game exploitation…