Learning Rewards in Strategic Games

Antoine Bergerault, Cyrille Kone, Giorgia Ramponi

Understanding the objectives that drive agents' behavior is crucial in strategic environments, where multiple agents interact and adapt to one another. This challenge arises in domains such as cybersecurity, autonomous driving, and online markets, where agents' underlying incentives are typically unknown and must be inferred from their observed behavior. Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) provides a natural framework for this problem, but extending IRL to strategic multi-agent settings introduces a fundamental challenge: a reward that explains observed behavior does not necessarily induce optimal strategies when used for decision-making. In this work, we study this problem through the lens of \emph{strategic identifiability}, and show that learning from a fixed policy pair can be insufficient to strategically identify rewards, independent of the number of expert samples $K$. Motivated by this, we introduce an active IRL algorithm for two-player repeated Stackelberg games, in which the leader adaptively selects policies to elicit informative responses about the follower's reward. Combining maximum-likelihood estimation with experimental design, we derive finite-sample guarantees…