All-in-One: A Composable Attack on LLM Transformations
Quantization, pruning, and model merging are popular transformations applied to deployment-ready LLMs to improve efficiency and downstream performance. Recent work has shown that these transformations can introduce a security threat: an adversary can train a model that passes safety checks in its pre-transformed state, only turning malicious once it is transformed for deployment. However, prior attacks target one specific transformation (e.g., quantization) and generally rely on transformation-specific techniques, making them difficult to combine in practice. In this work, we introduce a simple, composable attack framework that targets multiple transformations simultaneously and triggers when any one of them is applied by a user. Our key insight is that the effect of each transformation can be approximated as a perturbation to the model weights, allowing us to jointly train the model with a benign loss on the original model and a malicious loss on each simulated transformed model. These perturbations are simple enough to simulate at every training iteration across diverse transformations, making them practically combinable within a single training objective, enabling a unified…
- arXiv
- 2610.33298
- Authors
- Xiaohua Zhan, Kazuki Egashira, Robin Staab, Mark Vero, Martin Vechev
- Categories
- cs.LG