Replication or Corroboration? An Axiomatic Framework for Evidential Dependence in Multi-Agent Debate

Hoang-Loc Cao, Truong Thanh Hung Nguyen, Phuc Truong Loc Nguyen, Vo Thanh Khang Nguyen, Phuc Ho +4

In multi-agent debates, matching reports can arise for two different reasons: agents may repeat the same evidence (replication), or they may provide separate evidential roots that support the same claim (corroboration). A judge must distinguish these two cases. Counting report occurrences gives extra weight to relays, paraphrases, alias resubmissions, and excerpt splits, while merging all matching content avoids this only by also removing genuine corroboration. We formalize this tension as a minimal judgment game in which acquiring new evidence is costly, but replication is cheap. We show that root replication invariance (RRI) is exactly threshold-uniform replication immunity. Under RRI, replication-only deviations cannot change the verdict, and positive-cost replication is strictly dominated, whereas occurrence-sensitive and content-keyed judges admit profitable deviations. We also establish an information boundary: if a judge's observation interface cannot distinguish a replica from a matched fresh root, no judge can both ignore the replica and respond strictly to the fresh root. To preserve this distinction, we introduce the lineage quotient, which removes wording, identity,…