Blindfold: Keeping the Audit Coin Secret from LLM Agents

Wei Zhu, Meiyun Zuo, Huiping Sun

Audit-based certification bounds the violation rate of an LLM agent by auditing a random fraction $\varepsilon$ of actions and reweighting the audited labels; its validity is meant to rest only on the defender's audit coin. We show that it also rests on a confidentiality property: the coin must not interfere with the agent's view before the action commits, at a time the agent chooses. We call this pre-commit noninterference (PNI) and measure its violation by $D_{\mathrm{A}}$, the total-variation distance between the agent's views under the two coin values. PNI is necessary and sufficient for an unbiased certificate against adaptive agents, the worst-case bias is $(1-\varepsilon)D_{\mathrm{A}}$, and no procedure that sees only audited labels can pay less. Leakage composes across steps, a resource shared across episodes opens a channel of computable size, and raising the audit rate cannot restore validity. On a monitor we built, a silent audit changes no output but adds latency that tool timestamps expose, and the agent can enlarge it. A real LLM agent follows an injection that names a visible audit notice (generic, tool, and timing clauses have no effect); over that channel the…