Opening the Black Box of Neural Auction Mechanisms

Li Kong, Zilong Liu, Haoyang Zhou, Hanbing Liu, Qi Qi

Neural auction design has emerged as a powerful paradigm within automated mechanism design for modern Web platforms. Because these learned mechanisms directly dictate critical economic outcomes, their lack of internal transparency raises significant auditability and trust concerns. Opening this black box \textit{post-hoc} is therefore essential, yet presents two distinctive challenges: (1) activation contexts are dense, correlated numerical profiles devoid of explicit semantic structure, and (2) feature interpretations can only be falsifiably audited if they map to measurable auction states or outcomes. In this paper, we propose a post-hoc white-box auditing framework for unpacking trained neural auctions. Using CITransNet as a representative testbed, we first employ sparse autoencoders to decompose hidden representations while faithfully preserving downstream auction behavior. Anchoring feature interpretations to native economic targets, we validate them through activation prediction and causal interventions to isolate verified features from the reconstruction dictionary. Finally, applying this pipeline across varied auction settings, we show that the verified features can serve…