Treating the Model as an Untrusted Component: Deterministic Policy Enforcement, Human Approval and Taint Tracking Against Prompt Injection in Tool-Using Agents, with Validation on Open-Weights Models
Tool-using LLM agents act on instructions embedded in the data they read, so prompt injection is a structural rather than a prompt-wording problem. We compare in-prompt defences (hardened prompts, spotlighting, LLM detectors) with deterministic enforcement outside the model (four reference monitors of increasing strength), human approval and taint tracking, judged by one effect-based oracle independent of every defence in an executable environment of 13 tasks and 12 tools, with argument-fuzzing attackers and severity-weighted harm. In an evaluation with real open-weights models (Qwen2.5-1.5B and Qwen2.5-7B; 156 attack episodes per defence and model), the models proposed the attacker's call in 64% and 84% of attack episodes behind the task-bound monitor, which admitted 1.3% and 7.7%; guardrail effects depended on the model (a prompt guardrail moved obedience from 67% to 65% and from 86% to 55%, spotlighting plus a detector to 12% and 0%) against static attacks. Simulation with an assumed model covers what no real run did: under the assumed erosion law a persistent adaptive attacker or a compromised model drives every guardrail stack to 100.0% attack success, whereas the task-bound…
- arXiv
- 2611.11571
- Authors
- Mustafa S. Aljumaily, Nawar S. Alseelawi, Raghad Alshabandar
- Categories
- cs.CR · cs.AI