Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems in Grounded Arithmetic
Reflective Grounded Arithmetic (RGA) is a paracomplete arithmetic in which every term is a program and truth is grounded evaluation. RGA discharges a hypothesis only when it proves the hypothesis decided. This paper shows, in a machine-checked Isabelle/HOL development, how Gödel's incompleteness theorems hold for RGA and for systems built on it. RGA's implication is material and RGA has the disjunction property, so the implications the textbook proof of the second theorem uses fail while its entailments and rules hold: Gödel's proof survives as entailments. RGA does not prove its consistency sentence Con, and RGA derives its own second theorem as the entailment $\mathit{Con}\vdash\neg\mathit{Pr}(\ulcorner\mathit{Con}\urcorner)$ and as one sentence quantified over proofs. The second theorem is then proved once, for every Gödel extension of RGA: an entailment relation on RGA's language, closed under RGA's rules, with a checker that meets three structural conditions, NEC, D3 and EXPL as proof transformers, D1 as closed acceptance, and consistency. D2 is not among the conditions. RGA with its checker is one instance. Inductive Grounded Arithmetic (IGA), RGA with ground induction, is…
Gödel's incompleteness theorems in grounded arithmetic
- arXiv
- 2611.13697
- Authors
- Bryan Ford
- Categories
- math.LO · cs.LO · cs.PL